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1 
The Implication of Terms-in-Fact: Good Faith, Contextualism, and Interpretation 1 
Martin A. Hogg* 2 
U.S. contract law has a rich heritage of good faith jurisprudence. By contrast, the good 3 
faith jurisprudence of the U.K. is relatively underdeveloped. This article undertakes to examine 4 
the role of good faith in the implication of terms-in-fact in British contract law. The analysis 5 
extends to both English and Scottish cases, with some comparative reference to US law. The 6 
article begins by exploring the values and standards that good faith connotes. A distinction is 7 
then drawn between two uses of good faith: procedural good faith (that is, using good faith to 8 
decide whether or not to imply terms) and substantive good faith (implying terms whose content 9 
requires adherence to a good faith standard). British courts have not been receptive to procedural 10 
good faith, but there is a growing body of cases in which substantive good faith has been implied 11 
by courts, especially with respect to relational contracts. In adjudicating on whether or not to 12 
imply terms of a good faith nature, courts have sought to take account of the intention of the 13 
parties and have taken a highly contextual approach.  14 
A. INTRODUCTION 15 
The implication of terms into specific contracts (“implied-in-fact” terms) touches upon a 16 
number of fundamental aspects of contract law: freedom of contract, the purposes for which 17 
parties enter into contracts, the role of courts in relation to gap-filling, and the relationship 18 
between gap-filling and interpretation of express terms. The interaction of these issues is 19 
complex and in recent times has become more so given the burgeoning jurisprudence on the role 20 
that good faith may have in relation to implication of terms.  21 
The questions raised in this field may be considered from both a jurisdiction-specific as 22 
well as a comparative perspective. From a jurisdiction-specific perspective, some jurisdictions 23 
  
2 
have more settled approaches to good faith than others. The U.S. common law position is easier 24 
to identify—a rule of good faith having been built into both the Uniform Commercial Code 25 
(“U.C.C.”)1 and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.2 The narration of the good faith duty in 26 
each instrument is almost identical, with the U.C.C. version stating that “[e]very contract or duty 27 
. . . imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”3 This is narrower 28 
than the commonly-adopted sphere of application of good faith in civilian systems, and in the 29 
United States there remains United States a debate about what good faith means and what 30 
exactly it might prescribe in specific cases, but at least the existence of the succinctly-expressed 31 
rule is unarguable. The same cannot be said for English law, which lacks any legislative 32 
provision comparable to that found in the U.C.C. and where the tradition of Restatements is in its 33 
infancy.4  34 
From a comparative perspective, traditionally the European civilian systems and English 35 
common law have taken divergent approaches: The civilian jurisdictions have continued to take 36 
the idea of a distinct general principle of good faith seriously, while English common law, 37 
following initial hints during the era of Lord Mansfield that commercial contract law might be 38 
                                                 
* Professor of the Law of Obligations, Edinburgh Law School, Scotland (Martin.Hogg@ed.ac.uk).  
1 U.C.C. §1-304 (AM. LAW. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMMRS. ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2011). 
2 Restatement (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §205 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981). 
3 U.C.C. §1-304 (AM. LAW. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMMRS. ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2011). 
4 The first English foray in this field is the recent Restatement of the English Law of Contract by Andrew 




permeated by such a principle,5 has shunned the language of good faith in favor of isolated 39 
doctrines dealing with aspects of unfairness and unconscionable conduct. Bingham LJ 40 
memorably summed up the difference in approach: 41 
In many civil law systems, and perhaps in most legal systems outside the common law 42 
world, the law of obligations recognises and enforces an overriding principle that in 43 
making and carrying out contracts parties should act in good faith . . . . English law has, 44 
characteristically, committed itself to no such overriding principle but has developed 45 
piecemeal solutions in response to demonstrated problems of unfairness.6  46 
The author’s home jurisdiction of Scotland is neither wholly common law nor wholly civilian, 47 
but rather a mixed legal system. Perhaps appropriately, the views on the role which good faith 48 
ought to play in it have themselves been rather mixed: Some scholars have promoted the idea of 49 
                                                 
5 See Carter v. Boehm (1765) 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164, in which Lord Mansfield stated: “The governing 
principle is applicable to all contracts and dealings. Good faith forbids either party [from] concealing 
what he privately knows, to draw the other [party] into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his 
believing the contrary.” Lord Mansfield was concerned in the case with a duty to disclose certain facts 
within the context of the formation of a contract of insurance (on the facts he held the duty not to have 
been breached by the insured party). In Manifest Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Uni-Polaris Shipping Co. Ltd. 
[2003] 1 AC 469 (HL) [42] (appeal taken from Eng.), Lord Hobhouse said: “. . . Lord Mansfield was at 
the time attempting to introduce into English commercial law a general principle of good faith, an attempt 
which was ultimately unsuccessful and only survived for limited classes of transactions, one of which was 
insurance.”  




good faith as an umbrella concept capable of explaining scattered contractual doctrines and 50 
(within limits) of developing the law,7 or even the view that good faith lies at the heart of every 51 
contractual relationship;8 others have been more skeptical, arguing that a rule requiring a party to 52 
act in good faith when contracting with another “undermines the whole rationale of contractual 53 
freedom.”9 This breadth of opinion stands rather in contrast to the English scholarly landscape, 54 
where good faith skepticism has predominated (without being universal)10 among legal scholars. 55 
Recent Scottish case law, however, has typically followed the English generally skeptical lead, 56 
with one (notably Anglophile) judge commenting that “[i]t is, of course, no part of Scots law 57 
that, in the absence of agreement, parties to a contract should act in good faith in carrying out 58 
their obligations to each other.”11 The suggestion made in an earlier House of Lords Scottish 59 
appeal that there is a “broad principle in the field of contract law of fair dealing in good faith”12 60 
has not thus been firmly echoed by later judges. 61 
                                                 
7 See Hector L. MacQueen, Good Faith in the Scots Law of Contract: An Undisclosed Principle? in 
GOOD FAITH IN CONTRACT AND PROPERTY 5, 7 (A.D.M. Forte ed., 1999). 
8 See 11 THE LAWS OF SCOTLAND: STAIR MEMORIAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA 416 (1990) )(“Conventional 
obligations can themselves be considered as exigible simply on grounds of the requirements of good faith. 
Each party to a contract necessarily engages the trust of the other . . . .”). 
9 Joseph M. Thomson, Good Faith in Contracting: A Sceptical View in Forte, supra 7, at 64. 
10 For a more positive view, see generally David Campbell, Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the 
“Relational” Contract 77 MODERN L. REV. 475, which supports the view that the body of specific duties 
in English law together constitute a doctrine of good faith and do the same work as a general doctrine. 
11 EDI Cent. Ltd. v. Nat’l Car Parks Ltd. [2010] CSOH 141 [23] (Scot.) ( Lord Glennie).  
12 Smith v. Bank of Scotland  [1997] UKHL 26 (appeal taken from Scot.) (Lord Clyde). 
  
5 
The remainder of this article, following a brief discussion on the meaning of good faith, 62 
will offer analysis structured in part around a division between two roles for good faith, one 63 
procedural and the other substantial; the focus of the discussion will be English and Scottish 64 
common law, with some reference to U.S. law also. The suggested procedural-substantive 65 
division posits a difference between, on the one hand, using good faith as a reason to imply a 66 
term (procedural good faith) and, on the other, implying a term that a party has to conduct itself 67 
in good faith (substantive good faith).  68 
The first role would see good faith operating as a gateway or threshold (conceivably as an 69 
alternative to the traditional threshold of necessity) for justifying the implication of a term in 70 
fact, the argument being that it would be consistent with the good faith relationship of the parties 71 
to imply a suggested term (the content of the term might or might not make reference to good 72 
faith). One is not likely to find evidence of this role for good faith in the British courts: Those 73 
courts have in the past shown themselves unwilling to use “reasonableness” as a basis upon 74 
which to imply terms,13 and identical or similar concerns to those arising when rejecting 75 
reasonableness also arise in respect of good faith. The principal concerns are that procedural 76 
good faith would encourage judicial activism and infringe the autonomy and contractual freedom 77 
of parties. Additionally, implying terms for reasons of good faith would produce an 78 
inconsistency with the traditional “necessity” test for implication: Such a test imposes a higher 79 
hurdle for implication than does good faith, as many implied terms which might be consistent 80 
with a good faith contractual relationship would not necessarily be required to give business 81 
efficacy to the contract.14  82 
                                                 
13 Infra Part C. 
14 Infra Part C. 
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The second role for good faith relates to the content of implied terms: the language of 83 
good faith might be used when framing contractual duties (or, without expressly mentioning 84 
good faith, when framing implied terms with a similar substantive effect). The employment of 85 
good faith in defining the content of implied-in-fact terms might happen at a very generalized 86 
level, for instance through specification that “each party shall perform its obligations under the 87 
contract in a manner consistent with good faith” or “each party shall exercise its remedies under 88 
this contract in a manner consistent with the good faith nature of the parties’ relationship”; or it 89 
might be used in describing more specific duties, for instance by specifying that “the customer 90 
shall act in a way consistent with good faith when considering requests for extensions of time 91 
under this clause” or “if the price adjustment mechanism under this clause is activated by either 92 
party, the parties shall re-negotiate the price in good faith.” An example of a term which, though 93 
not explicitly mentioning good faith, could be described as substantively reflecting the concept 94 
would be one specifying that “the parties shall co-operate to ensure that their respective 95 
obligations under the contract are performed, and that their respective aims in entering into the 96 
contract are achieved.”15 An early reported example of this sort is the Scottish House of Lords 97 
                                                 
15 The contract at issue in TSG Bldg. Servs. PLC v. South Anglia Hous. Ltd., [2013] EWHC (TCC) 1151, 
contained such a term, requiring that “[t]he Partnering Team members shall work together and 
individually in the spirit of trust, fairness, and mutual co-operation for the benefit of the Term 
Programme . . . and in all matters governed by the Partnering Contract they shall act reasonably and 
without delay.”  Id. at [4]. A somewhat similar sort of circumstance is that of an implied obligation not to 
do something, necessary because doing the interdicted conduct would thwart the contract’s purposes. See 
Berkeley Community Villages Ltd. v. Pullen [2007] EWHC 1330 (Ch) [66], [67], [134] (Eng.), where (on 
the assumption that its first decision on an express obligation was incorrect) the court was willing to 
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appeal, Mackay v. Dick,16 in which a term was implied that each party undertook to do all that 98 
was necessary for the carrying out of matters which could only be achieved with the concurrence 99 
of both parties (in other words, a duty of mutual co-operation).17 100 
B. DEFINITIONAL MATTERS 101 
Before analyzing procedural and substantial good faith in more detail, something should briefly 102 
be said about the perennially thorny issue of how to define the idea of good faith. 103 
Good faith (or functionally equivalent ideas), a concept of some antiquity,18 can be 104 
described in broad-brush terms. At its most broad-brush, one might describe good faith as 105 
“behaving decently”; one may then have regard to community standards of decency to decide 106 
                                                 
imply a term requiring the defendants not to sell some land, because to do so would disable them from 
performing various obligations imposed on them under a contract between the parties).  
16 (1881) 6 App. Cas. (HL) 251, (1881) 8 R. (H.L.) 37 (appeal taken from Scot.). 
17 See id. at 40 (L. Blackburn). In fact, the view was expressed in the House of Lords that such a term was 
to be implied into all courts, and not just that before the court, so this is really an example of a term 
implied-at-law and not just in fact. 
18 The concept of bona fides (good faith) in Roman law is the primary historical source of the notion of 
good faith in modern Civilian jurisprudence, see Robert H. Jerry, II, The Wrong Side of the Mountain: A 
Comment on Bad Faith's Unnatural History, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 1317, 1319–37 (1994) (outlining the 
evolution of good faith from Roman law through canon, English, and American law). Modern Greek law 
also draws on the ancient Greek concept of pistis (πίστις) meaning faithfulness, a term also employed in 
passages of the New Testament. See generally JAMES L. KINNEAVY, GREEK RHETORICAL ORIGINS OF 
CHRISTIAN FAITH: AN INQUIRY (1987) (interpreting the usage of the word pistis in the New Testament); 
Dimitrios Kremalis, Good Faith in Greek Employment Law, 32 Comp. Lab. L. & Pol'y J. 631, 634–41 
(2011) (discussing origins of good faith doctrines and impact on modern Greek employment law).  
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exactly what conduct is mandated in specific circumstances (the U.C.C. speaks of “reasonable 107 
commercial standards of fair dealing”19). Being a little more specific, certain fundamental 108 
characteristics of “decent” behavior have been suggested, most commonly: honesty,20 109 
openness,21 loyalty/fidelity,22 mutual trust and confidence.23 Such qualities have in appropriate 110 
cases been transformed by courts into legal duties to be honest, open, loyal, and trustworthy 111 
(such duties sometimes being translated into even more specific duties, as discussed in section D 112 
                                                 
19 U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW. INST. & NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). 
20 A quality said in Yam Seng Pte. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp. Ltd. [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 [135] to 
underlie “almost all contractual relationships.” See also Lord Bingham in HIH Cas. v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank [2003] UKHL 6 [15] (appeal taken from Eng.): “Parties entering into a commercial contract . . .  
will assume the honesty and good faith of the other; absent such an assumption they would not deal.” The 
U.C.C. highlights honesty as a principal quality of good faith: see U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(20) (AM. LAW. INST. 
& NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 2014). 
21  [I]n so far as English law may be less willing than some other legal systems to interpret 
the duty of good faith as requiring openness of the kind described by Bingham L.J. 
in Interfoto (n. 6) as “playing fair” “coming clean” or “putting one’s cards face upwards 
on the table”, this should be seen as a difference of opinion, which may reflect different 
cultural norms, about what constitutes good faith and fair dealing in some contractual 
contexts rather than a refusal to recognize that good faith and fair dealing are required. 
Yam Seng [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 at [151] (Leggatt J) (quoting Interfoto Picture Library 
Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. (1989) 1 QB 433 at 439. 
22 “Another aspect of good faith . . .  is what may be described as fidelity to the parties’ bargain”. Id. at 
[139]. 
23 Id. at [142]. 
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below). This approach has the virtue of employing succinct, intuitive qualities, and has been a 113 
favored approach of British courts in those cases where good faith arguments have been 114 
successful before them. Were one to take a more skeptical view, it might be said that the alleged 115 
umbrella concept of good faith is redundant, given judicial reference to and deployment of these 116 
more specific qualities.    117 
 An alternative approach to the definitional question would be to attempt to provide a 118 
more detailed, comprehensive definition. In discussing the topic of good faith with his students, 119 
the author has ventured on occasion to offer one such definition (without suggesting that this is 120 
necessarily the preferred way of seeing good faith). That suggested definition has been as 121 
follows:  122 
A contractual duty to act in good faith is a duty to act honestly and openly in one’s 123 
dealings with the other contracting party, which includes not seeking to take unfair 124 
advantage of the other party, disclosing all such information to the other party the failure 125 
to disclose which would distort an honest and open contractual relationship, and treating 126 
the other party not simply as an adversary but as a co-operative agent.  127 
This sort of comprehensive definition builds upon elements of good faith practice which have 128 
cropped up repeatedly in the pleadings of cases. While this approach offers a supposedly 129 
complete set of suggested issues for examination, its weakness is that it is a bit of a mouthful, 130 
something which the author’s students have not failed to point out; moreover, as an attempt at 131 
comprehensiveness, it runs the risk of having ignored further fundamental aspects of good faith 132 
which might later be argued to be necessary for any comprehensive definition (and which would 133 
presumably then have to be added in order to make an even longer definition).  134 
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 A third approach would be to argue that good faith has no universally applicable content, 135 
but rather acquires a variable, contextual meaning which is dependent upon the specific facts of 136 
specific contractual relationships. Professor Hugh Beale (one of the editors of the Principles of 137 
European Contract Law24) has explored this approach in some of his writing,25 though he has 138 
also suggested that, in some cases, good faith ultimately boils down to reasonableness.26 An 139 
approach of undefined but variable content suffers from the obvious weakness: That, by making 140 
it mean whatever we want it to mean, the concept becomes meaningless. Furthermore, if some 141 
anchor for a context specific approach is needed, such that we end up saying that good faith is 142 
just reasonableness, why then duplicate what we already have in the distinct concept of 143 
reasonableness?  144 
 The point in briefly examining these definitional issues is both to point out that the 145 
British courts have favored the first approach to the definition of good faith (i.e. the aspects of 146 
behaving decently approach), as well as to argue that whichever definitional approach to good 147 
faith one chooses—say, for argument’s sake, it is indeed the first approach—that approach could 148 
be applied both to what this article has called procedural good faith as well as to substantive 149 
good faith. In other words, however we identify communitarian qualities of decent behavior, we 150 
                                                 
24 THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PARTS 
I AND II (O. Lando and H. Beale eds. 2000; THE COMMISSION ON EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, 
PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW, PART III (O. Lando et al eds. 2003),  
25 See generally Hugh Beale, General Clauses and Specific Rules in the Principles of European Contract 
Law: The “Good Faith” Clause inEUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Stefan Grundmann & Denis Mazeaud 
eds. 2006). 
26 Id. at 216. 
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could use them both as potential reasons to imply terms into contracts as well as to frame the 151 
content of any terms so implied. Despite this definitional flexibility, the following section will go 152 
on to develop the argument that good faith is not a sufficient ground for implying a term into a 153 
contract.  154 
 Whichever approach one takes to defining good faith, debates remain in European 155 
contract law as to whether as a matter of fact it is a characteristic of all contractual relationships 156 
(a question of fact) or at least ought to be presumed to be so (a normative question).27 The 157 
suggestion that good faith characterizes all contracts, as a matter of fact, is unconvincing, 158 
fictional, paternalistic, and rose-tinted view. Sometimes, contracting parties are thrown together 159 
in less than ideal circumstances and may be forced to contract out of necessity rather than 160 
preference. In such cases, each party may in reality be trying to squeeze out the best possible 161 
bargain, may mistrust the other party, may attempt to avoid transparency, may demonstrate little 162 
co-operation, and may feel little sense of loyalty to the other party. Even if some such contracts 163 
are “relational,” they are surely very imperfect relations. While it is not beneficial to deny such 164 
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Madeline Van Rossum, The Principles of European Contract Law, A Review Essay, 
3 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. 69, 72–73 (1996).  But see Larry A. DiMatteo, Contract Talk: 
Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the Principles of European Contract Law, 
43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 569, 575 n.18 (2002). In the US, however, many jurisdictions have held that 
all contracts contain an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing: See, e.g., Morris v. 
Macione, 546 So.2d 969 (Miss. 1989); Sons of Thunder, Inc., v. Borden, Inc., 690 A.2d 575, 
587, 148 N.J. 396, 420 (N.J. 1997); Sutherland v. Barclays American/Mortgage Corp., 53 Cal. 
App. 4th 299, 314 (C.A. 1997).  
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contracts the force of law, if good faith is not (as a matter of fact) present in such relationships, it 165 
seems absurd to require it by way of an implied legal duty. That is not to say, however, that even 166 
in contracts where the parties mistrust each other there should not be applicable those minimal 167 
requirements of fairness necessary to make the contract work. These requirements are embodied 168 
in established contractual rules, for instance in rules against positive deception, rules related to 169 
the principle of mutuality of contract, and rules regulating the enforcement of remedies. Such 170 
rules do apply to all contracts, but they need not absolutely be justified in good faith terms. 171 
Judicial commentary on the issue of whether one needs to see good faith as underlying all 172 
instances of contract, or rather (as I contend) that the presence or absence of a good faith 173 
relationship is a matter of fact to be judged in each case, would be welcome.  174 
C. USING GOOD FAITH TO IMPLY TERMS IN FACT (PROCEDURAL GOOD 175 
FAITH) 176 
As well as expressing the sorts of decent behavior identified in the previous section, good 177 
faith has also often been said to have a connection with the qualities of reasonableness and 178 
fairness: Specifically, it can be argued that that which accords with good faith must be fair and 179 
reasonable, and thus not excessively in favor of the interests of one party or the other.28 On this 180 
view, reasonableness and fairness may be seen as component qualities of the broader concept of 181 
good faith. That being so, it is important to recall that in numerous judgments the British courts 182 
have made the point that, just because it might be fair and reasonable to do so, that is not a 183 
sufficient ground for implying a term into a contract; rather, it is a necessary but not sufficient 184 
                                                 
28 Sometimes fairness is said to be inherent in good faith; sometimes it is said to be closely related but 




requirement that it should be reasonable and equitable to imply any argued for implied term. This 185 
stipulation was identified by Lord Simon in a decision of the Privy Council as one of five 186 
requirements for implying term in fact: 187 
[F]or a term to be implied, the following conditions (which may overlap) must be 188 
satisfied: (1) it must be reasonable and equitable; (2) it must be necessary to give 189 
business efficacy to the contract, so that no term will be implied if the contract is 190 
effective without it; (3) it must be so obvious that “it goes without saying”; (4) it must be 191 
capable of clear expression; (5) it must not contradict any express term of the contract.29 192 
The necessity, but insufficiency, of fairness and reasonableness was echoed in the recent 193 
comments of Lord Neuberger in the U.K. Supreme Court case of Marks & Spencer PLC v. BNP 194 
Paribas Securities Services Trust Co. (Jersey) Ltd. (“M&S”)30. His lordship said that  195 
[A] term should not be implied into a detailed commercial contract merely because it 196 
appears fair or merely because one considers that the parties would have agreed it if it 197 
had been suggested to them. Those are necessary but not sufficient grounds for including 198 
a term.31  199 
Lord Neuberger went further and added, in relation to Lord Simon’s requirement of 200 
reasonableness and equity, that “it is questionable whether Lord Simon’s first requirement, 201 
reasonableness and equitableness, will usually, if ever, add anything: If a term satisfies the other 202 
                                                 
29 BP Refinery (Westernport) Pty. Ltd. v. President, Councillors and Ratepayers of the Shire of Hastings 
(1977) 180 CLR 222, 283 (Austl.) (Lord Simon). 
30 [2015] UKSC 72. 
31 Id. at [21].  
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requirements, it is hard to think that it would not be reasonable and equitable.”32 So, that it would 203 
be reasonable to imply a term is not enough to permit a court to do so. The position adopted by 204 
British courts on these matters is comparable to that found in §204 of the Restatement (Second) 205 
of Contracts: “When the parties . . . have not agreed with respect to a term which is essential to a 206 
determination of their rights and duties, a term which is reasonable in the circumstances is 207 
supplied by the court.” 208 
 The second and third of Lord Simon’s above-noted requirements condense what are 209 
respectively known as the “business efficacy” test and the “officious bystander”33 test for 210 
implication. The status of these two tests has at times been somewhat uncertain: Are they 211 
alternative tests, fulfilment of either satisfying the hurdle for implication, or are they cumulative? 212 
The view of Lord Neuberger in M&S was that the two tests “can be alternatives in the sense that 213 
only one of them needs to be satisfied, although I suspect that in practice it would be a rare case 214 
where only one of those two requirements would be satisfied.”34 The two tests were again used 215 
as dual checks in the more recent U.K. Supreme Court case of Airtours Holidays Transport Ltd. 216 
v. Commissioners for H.M. Revenue and Customs,35 itself referred to approvingly in the Scottish 217 
first instance case of Acotec U.K. Ltd. v. McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd.36 Additionally, the business 218 
                                                 
32 Id. 
33 So-called as a result of the remark of Mackinnon L.J. in Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. v. Shirlaw 
[1939] 2 KB 206 at 227 (Eng.), that an implied term is one which is so obvious that, were an officious 
bystander to suggest it, the contracting parties would reply “Oh, of course!”.  
34 M&S [2015] UKSC 72 at [21]. 
35 [2016] UKSC 21 (appeal taken from Eng.); see id. at [38] (Lord Neuberger).  
36 [2016] CSOH 134. See id. at [18] (Lord Doherty). 
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efficacy test was very recently applied by the U.K. Supreme Court in Impact Funding Solutions 219 
Ltd. v. A.I.G. Europe Ltd.37  220 
 It is these traditional tests for implication, set in the context of Lord Simon’s six points 221 
listed above, which act as a guide for British courts when implying terms in fact. The radical 222 
attempt by Lord Hoffmann in Attorney General of Belize v. Belize Telecom Ltd.38 to align 223 
implication with the process of interpretation of contract did not find favor among the later M&S 224 
Supreme Court bench:39 Lord Neuberger warned that “Lord Hoffmann’s analysis in the Belize 225 
Telecom case could obscure the fact that construing the words used and implying additional 226 
words are different processes governed by different rules.”40 Lord Hoffmann’s approach to 227 
interpretation of contract was that of what might be called “broad contextualism,” i.e. of taking 228 
into account any information which might be relevant to the meaning of the parties’ agreement. 229 
As the Supreme Court in M&S has distanced itself from the view that interpretation and 230 
implication are part of the same task of discovering what the contract means, does this mean that 231 
the M&S Supreme Court did not see the task of implication as in some way contextual? No. 232 
Context was thought to be important to the process of implication, Lord Neuberger noting: 233 
[T]he factors to be taken into account on an issue of construction, namely the words used 234 
in the contract, the surrounding circumstances known to both parties at the time of the 235 
                                                 
37 [2016] UKSC 57. See id at [31]–[32] (Lord Hodge). 
38 [2009] UKPC 10 (appeal taken from Belize). 
39 M&S [2015] UKSC 72 at [31]; contra id. at [58] (Lord Carnwath SCJ, concurring) (expressing 
agreement with the approach adopted in).  
40 Id. at [26]. This view has been the subject of later favorable judicial citation: see, e.g., Globe Motors, 
Inc. v. T.R.W. Lucas Varity Electric Steering Ltd. [2016] EWCA (Civ) 396 [68]. (Beatson LJ). 
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contract, commercial common sense, and the reasonable reader or reasonable parties, are 236 
also taken into account on an issue of implication.41 237 
The surrounding circumstances, i.e., the context in which the contract was made, is thus to be 238 
taken into account when deciding whether or not to imply a term.  239 
If there is, according to the M&S court, a difference between interpretation and 240 
implication, and yet context is important to both processes, how then does each process differ 241 
(specifically, how is the role of context different in each)? Analyzing the recent jurisprudence of 242 
the Supreme Court, including what is said in M&S, it seems that the difference is twofold: 243 
 (1) The process of implication only begins (says Lord Neuberger in M&S) “after the 244 
process of construing the express words is complete”42 (a view reaffirmed in the Impact 245 
Funding Solutions case43). The two are not, in some sense, alternative processes, and it is 246 
not permissible to seek to persuade a court to interpret a contract in such a way that it is 247 
effectively implying a good-faith based duty;44  248 
                                                 
41 M&S [2015] UKSC 72 at [27] (emphasis added). 
42 Id. at  [28]. 
43 See Impact Funding Sols. Ltd. v. AIG Europe Ins. Ltd., [2016] UKSC 57 [31] (Lord Hodge). 
44 In this respect, note the warning given by Beatson L.J. in Globe Motors: “[C]are must be taken not to 
seek to achieve that which might be achieved by implication by an inappropriate approach to 
interpretation,” Globe Motors at [71]. In the matter before Beatson L.J., breach of an implied obligation 
would have been time-barred, which encouraged him not to interpret the contract in the way argued for by 
the appellant. Id. at [87]. It is, however, noteworthy that Beatson L.J. seems to view the question of 
implication as a prior one to that of interpretation of the express terms: “. . . once an implied term is 
excluded and the question is what the language of the Agreement permits, I consider that it was not open 
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(2) in relation to the process which comes first, interpretation, the recent trend of the 249 
Supreme Court has been to pay greater attention to the express words of the parties, and 250 
in particular their primary meaning in ordinary speech.45  251 
On this approach, the wider context—the surrounding circumstances—may sometimes not need 252 
to be considered when a contract is being interpreted. In relation to implication, the approach is 253 
different: The wider context can always be considered as part of the exercise of implication, so 254 
long as what that wider context suggests does not contradict any express term of the contract (the 255 
fifth of Lord Simon’s rules). That said, it is noticeable that the “factual background,” as 256 
described in the judgment of Lord Neuberger in M&S, makes no reference to the background 257 
circumstances surrounding the formation of the contract; in deciding whether or not to imply a 258 
term, the M&S court did not concern itself with what was in the minds of the actual parties to the 259 
case,46 but only with the terms of the lease against the relevant background common law and 260 
statutory rules. 261 
                                                 
to the judge to interpret the terms of the Agreement in the way he did.” Id. This is at odds with the 
approach of the Supreme Court in M&S.  M&S [2015] UKSC 72 at [28]. See supra note 37.). 
45 See Arnold v. Britton [2015] UKSC 36 [56]. 
46 Indeed, as Lord Neuberger notes in M&S: “Lord Steyn rightly observed that the implication of a term 
was ‘not critically dependent on proof of an actual intention of the parties’ when negotiating the contract. 
If one approaches the question by reference to what the parties would have agreed, one is not strictly 
concerned with the hypothetical answer of the actual parties, but with that of notional reasonable people 
in the position of the parties at the time at which they were contracting.” M&S [2015] UKSC 72 at [21]. 
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What one can discern from the judgments of the post-Hoffmann, Neuberger Supreme 262 
Court about judicial determination of parties’ disputes concerning the terms of their contracts 263 
may be summed up in the following diagram: 264 







      272 







The principal points to emphasize, for present purposes, about the above discussion are 280 
(1) reasonableness is not a sufficient ground for implying a term (or indeed for interpreting a 281 
Construction of contracts: an 
overarching task enforcing the 
contract as concluded, which 
includes two separate, staged 
processes: (1) interpretation and (2) 
implication. 
Rectification of contracts: a 
separate task, which deals 
with parties’ request to change 
the contract as concluded to 
reflect their underlying 
agreement. 
Stage 1: Interpretation: begins from a 
narrow context – the words used by 
the parties, construed within the 
context of the contract as a whole 
(from which context the purpose of 
the parties in contracting is primarily 
to be assessed); if ambiguity remains, 
a wider context may be considered. 
Stage 2: Implication (undertaken after 
interpretative process): Can include 
consideration of the wider context, 
specifically the “surrounding 
circumstances known to both parties 
at the time of the contract”, so long as 
what this suggests does not contradict 
express terms.  
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word or phrase in a particular way); (2) one cannot try to circumvent that position by seeking to 282 
persuade a court (at stage one of the process of construction) to interpret a term in a way which is 283 
reasonable (or consistent with a good faith relationship); but (3) although reasonableness is not a 284 
sufficient criterion for implying a term, any term to be implied into a contract must be 285 
reasonable, and thus one to which “notional reasonable people in the position of the parties”47 286 
would have acceded had they addressed their minds to the matter in question.  287 
How can one extend these points about the role of reasonableness in the process of 288 
implication of contractual terms to good faith? This article suggests as follows: (1) Courts cannot 289 
imply terms simply because they believe that notional contracting parties acting in good faith 290 
would have acceded to them. Such an approach would be as much (if not greater) of a short 291 
circuit of the traditional tests for implication as the reasonableness threshold for implication to 292 
which the courts have objected; (2) going further, because good faith does not characterize all 293 
contractual relationships, the author believes that a British court would not say that, speaking in 294 
general terms, any term which is to be implied under the traditional tests must necessarily be one 295 
which is consistent with good faith. Good faith is thus, in general, neither a necessary nor 296 
sufficient reason for implying a term into a contract. Of course, matters will be otherwise where 297 
the relationship in question is, as a matter of fact, characterized by good faith: In such a case, any 298 
term to be implied would be one to which notional parties acting in good faith would have 299 
acceded as well as being one which is necessary to make commercial sense of the contract. 300 
D. WRITING GOOD FAITH INTO IMPLIED TERMS (SUBSTANTIVE GOOD 301 
FAITH) 302 
                                                 
47Id. at [21] (Lord Neuberger). 
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The article now turns to substantive good faith— the incorporation of the good faith 303 
standard into terms implied into specific contracts. 304 
In the exercise of implying terms into specific contracts, British courts have consistently 305 
said that context is paramount. That was one of the clear messages in the important judgment of 306 
Leggatt J. in Yam Seng Pte. Ltd. v. International Trade Corp Ltd.,48 which has been the subject 307 
of much analysis49 as well as subsequent citation by the English Court of Appeal in 2016.50 In 308 
his judgment, Leggatt J. also made it clear that implication hinged crucially on the “presumed 309 
intention of the parties.” Context and intention are undoubtedly inter-related: Some contexts will 310 
make it easier to presume the relevant party intention than others.  311 
 So, what exactly does substantive good faith require when implied into contracts, and 312 
how does the context of the parties’ relationship affect whether good faith terms are appropriate 313 
for implication? 314 
(1) What Does Good Faith Require by Way of Content?  315 
The broad requirements of good faith (discussed earlier in section A) are usually said to 316 
crystallize into more specific requirements in argued-for good-faith-based implied terms.51 Some 317 
                                                 
48 Yam Seng Pte. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp. Ltd. [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 [141]–[142]. 
49 See, e.g., Ewan McKendrick, Good Faith in the Performance of a Contract in English Law in 
COMPARATIVE CONTRACT LAW: BRITISH AND AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES–209 (Larry. DiMatteo and M. 
Hogg eds., 2016). 
50 See Globe Motors, Inc. v. TRW Lucas Varity Elec. Steering Ltd. [2016] EWCA (Civ) 396 [67] (Eng.). 
51 In Yam Seng, for instance, the two specific terms argued for were (1) that the defendant would not 
instruct or encourage the claimant “to incur marketing expenses [for products] which it was unable or 
unwilling to supply,” and that it would not “offer false information on which [the claimant] was likely to 
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of these requirements, however, could alternatively be considered to be inherent features of all 318 
contracts, rather than simply of those characterized by good faith. So, for instance, fidelity to the 319 
contract agreed by the parties could be characterized as a requirement deriving as a matter of 320 
course from the fact that the parties’ relationship has been embodied in a binding obligational 321 
form: The law, and not just the idea of good faith, requires us to adhere to contracts into which 322 
we have entered. That is the very nature of an obligatio (legal bond). There is, thus, a debate to 323 
be had about the extent to which some aspects of contractual relationships are best embodied in 324 
generally applicable contractual rules rather than implied terms (This article return to this issue 325 
below at 2(c), in discussing good faith and remedial entitlement).  326 
One thing which has consistently been observed by common law courts is that good faith 327 
does not require an absolute subservience of the interests of one party to those of another. 328 
Making this point, the Australian Justice Barrett commented:  329 
It must be accepted that the party subject to the obligation is not required to subordinate 330 
the party’s own interests, so long as pursuit of those interests does not entail unreasonable 331 
interference with the enjoyment of a benefit conferred by the express contractual terms so 332 
that the enjoyment becomes (or could become) . . . ‘nugatory, worthless or, perhaps, 333 
seriously undermined’ . . . [T]he implied obligation of good faith underwrites the spirit of 334 
the contract and supports the integrity of its character. A party is precluded from cynical 335 
resort to the black letter. But no party is fixed with the duty to subordinate self-interest 336 
entirely which is the lot of the fiduciary . . . . The duty is not a duty to prefer the interests 337 
                                                 
rely,” and (2) that the defendant “would not prejudice [the claimant’s] sales by offering the same products 
for sale within the same territories at a lower price than [the claimant] was permitted to offer.” Yam Seng, 
[2013] EWHC (QB) 111 at [155], [157]. 
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of the other contracting party. It is, rather, a duty to recognise and to have due regard to 338 
the legitimate interests of both the parties in the enjoyment of the fruits of the contract as 339 
delineated by its terms.52  340 
These remarks were cited approvingly by the English High Court in Gold Group Properties Ltd. 341 
v. B.D.W. Trading Ltd.53 342 
 So, good faith permits some self-interest, but self-interest that nonetheless reflects the 343 
qualities mentioned earlier: honesty, openness, loyalty/fidelity, mutual trust and confidence. But 344 
when might implied duties reflecting such values be appropriate?  345 
(2) The Nature of the Parties’ Relationship and Its Effect upon Implied Good Faith Duties 346 
The specific context of parties’ relationships has been said to affect the likelihood of 347 
good faith based terms being implied into their contract. In particular, recent jurisprudence has 348 
suggested that there is something special about “relational” contracts so far as the content of the 349 
good faith based terms which are to be implied is concerned.  350 
(a) What is a “relational” contract? 351 
The concept of a “relational” contract does not have an agreed single definition. One of 352 
the foremost proponents of relational contract theory, the late Professor Iain Macneil, was 353 
himself rather circumspect in describing relational contracts and the features identifying them. 354 
He ventured, however, that they were characterized by “whole person relations, relatively deep 355 
and extensive communication by a variety of modes, and significant elements of non-economic 356 
                                                 
52 Overlook Mgmt. BV v. Foxtel Mgmt. Pty. Ltd. [2002] NSWSC 17 [65]–[67] (Austl.) (quoting Byrne v. 
Australian Airlines Ltd. (1995) 185 CLR 410, 450 (Austl.)). 
53 [2010] EWHC (TCC) 1632 [90]. 
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personal satisfaction,”54 whilst noting that these were not the only features which distinguished 357 
contractual relations from what he styled contractual transactions (an example given by him of 358 
the latter being a one-off purchase of petrol at a service station). Some long-term commercial 359 
relations may involve significant elements of non-economic personal satisfaction (for instance, 360 
the employment relationship), but it is unlikely that all long-term relationships will do so (a point 361 
reinforced by some of the decisions mentioned below).  362 
Turning to judicial usages of the language of relational contracts, in Yam Seng Justice 363 
Leggatt distinguished contracts involving “a simple exchange” from those involving “a longer 364 
term relationship between the parties” in which they make a “substantial commitment.”55 A 365 
long-term relationship manifesting substantial mutual commitment was thus identified as the 366 
crucial feature. In Acer Investment Management Ltd. v. The Mansion Group Ltd.,56 which 367 
concerned an agreement between distributors of financial products and independent financial 368 
advisers,57 the judge held that the contractual arrangements were not relational, citing the fact 369 
that “[i]t was not a long-term relationship: either party could end it by giving a relatively short 370 
period of notice” and that “[n]either party was required to spend significant sums in reliance on 371 
the continuation of the relationship.”58 In those circumstances, he refused to imply a duty of 372 
                                                 
54 Ian R. Macneil, The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 So. Cal. L. Rev. 691,723 (1974). 
55 Yam Seng, [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 at [142]. 
56 [2014] EWHC (QB) 3011 (Eng.). 
57 Id. at [1]. The term argued for was “that the parties would deal with each other in good faith.” Id. at  
[2], [86], [101]. 
58 Id. at [107], [109]. 
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good faith into the contract.59 The analysis here is not entirely persuasive: The ability to end a 373 
contract by giving a short period of contractual notice is not necessarily inconsistent with a long-374 
term relationship, albeit that one would tend to expect a more extended termination period. 375 
Nonetheless, the length of the relationship (and hence of party commitment to it) was clearly 376 
significant in the judge’s mind, as it had been in Macneil’s writing. 377 
The need for ongoing communication and cooperation during the term of the contract 378 
would tend to indicate the existence of a relational contract; on that basis, a simple hire of goods 379 
is not likely to be relational, even though the hire may be for a number of years. In the recent 380 
case of National Private Air Transport Services Co. Ltd. v. Creditrade LLP,60 the judge thought 381 
that a contract for the hire of aircraft was not a relational contract within the meaning of the term 382 
set out in Yam Seng, and consequently refused to imply an argued for good faith based term.61  383 
What difference does a relational contract make to what is likely to be implied? It seems 384 
that the duties which can be implied are likely to be more onerous, more pro-active in what they 385 
require, and more co-operative in nature. The requirement to venture information to the other 386 
party (rather than just not to misled by what is said) may be consistent with such a contract: 387 
Leggatt J. suggests so in Yam Seng62, and the Scottish courts have in similar vein been willing to 388 
imply duties to provide information in appropriate cases.63 What other sorts of duties might be 389 
                                                 
59 Id. at 720. 
60 [2016] EWHC (Comm) 2144 (Eng.). 
61 Id. at [136]-[137]. 
62 Yam Seng [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 at [142]. 
63 For instance, see generally Acotec UK Ltd. v. McLaughlin & Harvey Ltd. [2016] CSOH 134 (Scot.); 
Scottish Power plc v. Kvaerner Constr.(Regions) Ltd. (1999) S.L.T. 721 and. 
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consistent with a relational contract? Might, perhaps, there be a duty on each party to report 390 
misconduct by a third party with whom one or both parties have a relationship, if such 391 
misconduct comes to the attention of either of them? Such a duty can arise within the context of 392 
an insurance contract,64 but conceivably a long-term relational contract might also create 393 
circumstances giving rise to such an implied duty.  394 
As a matter of interest for an American audience, it may be worth adding that dealing 395 
with the adjustments that may be needed in order to allow a contract to adapt to changed 396 
circumstances is easier in one respect in Scotland than in most common law systems. The sort of 397 
adjustment this article envisions is where, in changed economic circumstances, one of the parties 398 
asks for an element of the contract to be changed in its favor, and the other simply agrees 399 
(perhaps because it favors the long-term continuance of the contract over short term gain on its 400 
part). In the common law, this can be problematic: If A’s duties are reduced, or its rights 401 
increased, without any consideration being given for this improvement to its position, the 402 
agreement that this be so may not be enforceable, at least not without some conceptual sleight of 403 
hand (such as the “practical benefit” ground advanced in the English case of Williams v. Roffey 404 
Bros. & Nicholls (Contractors) Ltd.65). In systems like Scotland that lack  a requirement of 405 
contractual consideration, there is no problem with enforcing such contractual alterations: If 406 
parties agree to change a contract, that is the end of the matter, and the courts will give effect to 407 
their altered agreement. There is no need in such cases to call upon special circumstances 408 
pertaining to relational contracts, or to seek to construct some idea of consideration out of 409 
                                                 
64 See Banque Financière de la Cité S.A. v. Westgate Ins. Co. [1991] 2 A.C. 249, 251 (HL) (appeal taken 
from UK).  
65 [1991] 1 Q.B. 1.  
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practical benefit, or to search for good faith based implied terms, in order to reach the intended 410 
result; it is just a matter of respecting the will of the parties and enforcing the amended 411 
agreement. So, fundamental doctrinal positions (like that in relation to the need for 412 
consideration) can render recourse to relational contractual solutions necessary or obsolete, 413 
depending on the position taken.  414 
(b) Long-term vs. Short-term Contracts 415 
Post Yam Seng, there have been other reported cases of long-term, relational contracts 416 
into which courts have implied duties of good faith, as for instance Bristol Groundschool Ltd. v. 417 
Whittingham,66 which concerned a long-term contract for the supply of materials for use in 418 
training airline pilots.67 There is a contrast with cases of interim contracts: In one case involving 419 
a preliminary contract, it did not seem to the court that parties should be taken to have intended 420 
to be applicable a suggested implied term concerning good faith directed to the conduct of a 421 
potential long-term joint venture between them.68  422 
But the lengthy nature of a contract is not a guarantee that a court will always agree to the 423 
implication of a good faith based term. In Carewatch Care Services Ltd. v. Focus Caring 424 
Services Ltd.,69 which concerned long-term franchising contracts,70 the judge was not convinced 425 
                                                 
66 [2014] EWHC 2145 (Ch) at [196]. 
67 Id. at [4]. 
68 Hamsard 3147 Ltd. v. Boots U.K. Ltd., [2013] EWHC 3251 (Pat) at [84]. 
69 [2014] EWHC 2313 (Ch). 
70 The term argued for was that “The parties would conduct themselves as franchisor and franchisee in 
good faith and/or dealing with each other fairly and in particular not in a manner that would damage each 
other’s business interests. . . . ” Id. at [101].  
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that the terms argued for (the good faith term was one of seven alleged implied terms) was 426 
necessary for the agreement “to work commercially” (a remark framed with obvious reference to 427 
the business efficacy test for implying terms). On the view taken in this case, the fact that the 428 
parties are in a long-term contract is not of itself sufficient to justify implication of a good faith 429 
based term: Something more is needed. 430 
(c) Good Faith and the Right-to-Terminate: Monde Petroleum S.A. v. WesternZagros Ltd. 431 
In relation to the implication of terms requiring adherence to good faith, do we need to 432 
distinguish obligations to perform from remedial entitlements? In particular, is it easier to deploy 433 
good faith in the former category than in the latter? One recent case suggests so, at least so far as 434 
remedial entitlements which are non-discretionary in nature are concerned.  435 
In Monde Petroleum S.A. v. WesternZagros Ltd.71 the claimant argued that its agreement 436 
to terminate a consultancy agreement between the parties was obtained by misrepresentation 437 
and/or economic duress. One of the issues between the parties was the question of whether it was 438 
an implied term of the contract that the defendant would not exercise any right to terminate in 439 
bad faith or in any manner which unconscionably deprived the claimant of its accrued or future 440 
                                                 
71 [2016] EWHC (Comm) 1472. 
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rights.72 The claimant argued that such implication was necessitated by business efficacy (and/or 441 
by “operation of law”), citing a number of factors in support of this argument.73  442 
The judge (Richard Salter Q.C.) rejected the argument for implication, taking the view 443 
that nothing indicated that the contract would lack commercial or practical coherence without the 444 
implication of the argued for good faith term.74 His view was that the contract did not contain the 445 
sorts of mutual obligations and commitments that would be expected in the kind of relational 446 
contract described by Leggatt J. in Yam Seng.75 Of specific relevance for the present discussion, 447 
he added that a further “insuperable objection” to the alleged implication was that the suggested 448 
                                                 
72 Id. at [242]. The precise terms alleged to be implied into the contract (referred to in the judgment as the 
“CSA”) were as follows: “(a) each of the parties would act in good faith towards the other in the exercise 
of all of its rights and in performance of all of its obligations under the [CSA] generally, and in particular 
to give effect to the long-term, quasi-partnership nature of the parties business relationship; and/or . . . (c) 
[WZL]’s right to terminate the [CSA] (under clauses 10.2 and/or 10.3 thereof) would not be, and could 
not be, exercised other than in good faith and/or in a manner which unconscionably deprived and Monde 
of its accrued and/or future rights arising under the [CSA]; and/or (d) [WZL]’s right to terminate the 
[CSA] (under clauses 10.2 and/or 10.3 thereof) would only be exercised for the proper purpose for which 
it was conferred and not arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably (taking into account, inter-alia, Monde’s 
rights under and interests in the [CSA].” Id. 
73 Id. These included “(a) the close working relationship of mutual trust and confidence between the 
parties; (b) the stated common intention of the parties that the [contract] should be a long-term co-
operation . . . ; (c) the quasi-partnership nature of the [contract];” and “(d) the common intention of the 
parties that the [contract] should be for the mutual benefit of both [parties].” 
74 Id. at [235]. 
75Id. at [259]. 
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term was concerned not with performance but termination, commenting that “a contractual right 449 
to terminate is a right which may be exercised irrespective of the exercising party’s reasons for 450 
doing so,”76 in other words as an act not involving any discretion. In support of this view, the 451 
judge cited a 2012 opinion of the Court of Appeal to that effect (“[t]he right to terminate is no 452 
more an exercise of discretion, which is not to be exercised in an arbitrary or capricious (or 453 
perhaps unreasonable) manner, than the right to accept repudiatory conduct as a repudiation of a 454 
contract”77) as well as a number of other authorities.78 The judge commented on this matter: 455 
“Contractual discretions arise where there are a range of options from which to choose. A 456 
contractual right to terminate involves a binary choice.79” The choice in this case as to whether 457 
to terminate was a “binary choice . . . constrained only by the objective contractual requirements 458 
which limit the circumstances in which that choice can be made.”80 Even had the choice 459 
involved a subjective element, the judge would not have been persuaded by the need to impose a 460 
good faith limitation on it: “All contractual rights involve a choice. It is no more necessary to 461 
                                                 
76 Id. at [260]–[261]. 
77 Id. at [262]; Lomas v. J.B. Firth Rixon Inc. [2012] EWCA (Civ) 149 [46]. 
78  Monde Petroleum [2016] EWHC 1472 at [263] (citing Reda v. Flag Ltd. [2002] UKPC 38 [42]–
[43]; Hamsard 3147 Ltd. v. Boots U.K. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 3251 [82]–[88]; T.S.G. Building Services v. 
South Anglia Housing Ltd., 2013 EWHC 1151 (TCC) [43]–[51]; Greenclose Ltd. v. National Westminster 
Bank P.L.C., [2014] EWHC 1156 (Ch) [144]–[154]. 
79 Id. at [266]; see also, Myers v. Kestrel Acquisitions Ltd. [2015] E.H.W.C. 916 (Ch.) at. [61]. 
80 Monde Petroleum [2016] EWHC 1472 at [271.1]. 
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imply a limitation upon the power to assess whether the contractual circumstances in which that 462 
choice may be made have occurred than it is to imply a limitation upon the choice itself.”81 463 
The circumstances were not thus (so the judge thought) analogous to those in Socimer 464 
International Bank Ltd. v. Standard Bank London Ltd.,82 where the court had considered that a 465 
discretion given to one party had to be exercised honestly and in good faith (a decision which 466 
forms part of a consistent line of authority that where a discretionary power is conferred upon a 467 
party, there is to be implied a term that it must be exercised honestly and in good faith for the 468 
purpose for which it was conferred, and not exercised arbitrarily, capriciously, or 469 
unreasonably83). Summing up his view on the distinction between terms concerning performance 470 
and termination, the judge said: 471 
[T]he right to end a contract is different in kind to the sort of rights which may arise in 472 
the course of that contract’s performance. The purpose of a contractual right to terminate 473 
is to give the party on whom that right is conferred the power to bring the contract to an 474 
end. It is a right to bring an end to the parties’ shared endeavour. In my judgment, it is 475 
                                                 
81Id. at [271.2]. 
82 [2008] EWCA (Civ) 116, [2008] Bus. L. R.. 1304. 
83 See id. at [62] (citing Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Citibank Na [1998] Lloyd’s Rep. IR 221); see also; see also 
Abu Dhabi Nat’l Tanker Co. v. Prod. Star Shipping Ltd. [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 397 at 404; Clark v. 
Nomura Int’l plc [2000] IRLR 766 [40]; Paragon Finance plc v. Nash [2002] 1 WLR 685 [25];; Horkulak 
v. Cantor Fitzgerald Int’l [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1287 [85], [86], [2005] ICR 402; Keen v. Commerzbank 
A.G. [2006] EWCA (Civ) 1636 [52], [67], [2007] ICR 623; British Telecommunications PLC v. 
Telefónica O2 UK Ltd. [2014] UKSC 42; Brogden v. Investec Bank PLC [2014] EWHC (Comm.) 2785 
[91], [94], [100]. 
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unlikely that the hypothetical reasonable commercial man or woman would expect the 476 
party exercising that right to be obliged to consult anyone’s interests but its own.84 477 
What can be said about the judgment in Monde, and in particular of the judge’s view of 478 
good faith constraints on a right to terminate a contract? First, whatever one’s views on the 479 
desirability of the outcome, the underlying spirit of the judgment does appear to be at odds with 480 
that expressed in Socimer. In Socimer, it was said that commercial contracts presuppose the 481 
operation of good faith (“Commercial contracts assume such good faith, which is why express 482 
language requiring it is so rare”85); by contrast, in Monde the judge began by stating that “[t]here 483 
is no general doctrine of ‘good faith” in English contract law,’ rather a duty of good faith is 484 
implied by law only “as an incident of certain categories of contract”86 (a statement which 485 
mirrors the equally skeptical view of Jackson L.J. in Mid Essex Hospital).87 The English bench 486 
still seem to harbor a difference of opinion in relation to the desirability of recognizing a general 487 
doctrine of good faith.  488 
Second, what of the view that a right to terminate does not involve discretion, and of the 489 
view that parties would not expect it to be exercisable by reference to any interests except those 490 
of the party having the right? The author is not personally persuaded that a binary choice 491 
necessarily precludes the operation of discretion. The identification of the number of choices 492 
available does not fully address the element of discretion; rather, one needs to ask of a potential 493 
                                                 
84  Monde Petroleum [2016] EWHC 1472 at [272]. 
85 Socimer [2008] EWCA (CIV) [116] (Rix L.J.)  
86 Monde Petroleum [2016] EWHC 1472 .at [249]. 




decision facing a contracting party whether (1) any objectively ascertainable conditions requiring 494 
to be met before the decision may be exercised have been met—pre-eminently in termination 495 
cases, whether a sufficiently serious breach of contract has occurred; and (2) thereafter, what 496 
further conditions (if any) constrain the innocent party’s decision-making process. There may be 497 
none; but some further conditions may have been specified in the contract as applicable to the 498 
decision whether or not to terminate, e.g. that the decision must be made “reasonably” or “not 499 
arbitrarily.” Such conditions do not arise when exercising the default, common law right to 500 
terminate for breach, but they may form part of a contractually defined right to terminate. It 501 
therefore seems too blunt to assert that, in every contract, the right to terminate may not involve 502 
the exercise of a discretion; in some cases, it might conceivably do so. 503 
In the absence of additional conditions affecting the right to terminate, however, may a 504 
party be given an apparently absolute, unrestrained power to decide whether to terminate have 505 
regard purely to its own interests, or might it be required to some extent to consider the interests 506 
of the other party as well? Monde suggests the former. This is consistent with the traditional 507 
common law approach, and hence might well be argued to be consistent with the expectation of 508 
English contracting parties (as the judge suggests), at least for the present. But if good faith 509 
arguments are presented to courts with increasing frequency, it may be questioned for how much 510 
longer such decisions will continue to be consistent with parties’ expectations. There is of course 511 
also the point that the objective requirement (in Scots law at least) that a breach must be material 512 
before the right to terminate arises can be seen as an inbuilt good faith restraint on the right to 513 
terminate, albeit a restraint which takes into account only the severity of the breach rather than 514 
the specific circumstances and interests of the party in breach.88   515 
                                                 




If Monde is correct, then what it suggests ought to be applicable to other “non-516 
discretionary” remedies, such as the justified right to withhold performance in relation to the 517 
other party’s breach of contract (what is called retention in Scots law, or in civilian systems the 518 
exceptio non adimpleti contractus).89 Of course, as with the need to show that a breach is 519 
material before termination can occur, what are arguably good faith based limitations can be 520 
built into the rules governing such other remedies: So, in Scots law, there is a rule that only non-521 
trivial breaches of contract by one party entitle the other to withhold performance.90 This ensures 522 
that the self-help remedy is not used in a way that is out of proportion to the other party’s breach: 523 
attempting to do so would, it might be said, be a failure to “behave decently.” Note though that 524 
in this case it is a rule of contract law, rather than an implied term, which does the work of 525 
exercising restraint on parties’ free will. Note also that, because the common law remedy of 526 
retention can be excluded in Scotland, the parties being entitled to provide for their own scheme 527 
of justified withholding, a question arises of whether, in any such agreed scheme, it might be 528 
possible to argue for a good faith based break on the agreed right to withhold. On the approach 529 
taken in Monde the likely answer would be no.   530 
(d) Other Good Faith Jurisprudence  531 
In two further first instance English judgments handed down in 2016, the court took an 532 
unfavorable view towards alleged good faith based implied terms.  533 
In Apollo Window Blinds Ltd. v. McNeil,91 the Queen’s Bench refused to accede to a 534 
suggestion that a term be implied into a contract requiring one party, in good faith, to inform the 535 
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other party of its contractual rights (an entirely sensible view, it seems to me). There is an 536 
obvious contrast with the established duty in English law resting on contracting parties to point 537 
out to their intended contracting partners at the negotiating stage any exceptionally onerous 538 
terms:92 In such cases, the contract has not yet been formed, and the matter in question is a 539 
potentially onerous duty and not a right. In the second case, Hokin v. Royal Bank of Scotland 540 
PLC,93 the High Court was unwilling to imply a term that a party act in good faith in performing 541 
the terms of an agreement (specifically, it was alleged that in exercising any discretionary power, 542 
the bank should act in good faith and not arbitrarily or capriciously94) because the judge felt that 543 
there was insufficient evidence about the “relevant factual matrix” of the parties’ relationship 544 
(specifically, evidence about the “factual complexity of the relationship of the relevant 545 
individuals”95 before the execution of the agreement) for her to assess whether it was necessary 546 
for the court to make the implication.  547 
The comments of the judge in Hokin are a useful example of not only the crucial nature 548 
of the context of the parties’ relationship to the question of implication of any good faith based 549 
term but also of the need to plead such elements explicitly. They reinforce what was said in 2015 550 
in D. & G. Cars Ltd. v. Essex Police Authority:96 “both the existence and the content of an 551 
implied condition in relation to honesty and integrity is highly sensitive to the context of the 552 
                                                 
92 See Interfoto Picture Library Ltd. v. Stiletto Visual Programmes Ltd. [1989] 1 Q.B. 433 at 439 (Eng.). 
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contract itself.”97 In stressing the importance of pleading the specifics of the context, Hokin and 553 
D. & G. follow the lead taken by Yam Seng98 and Mid Essex Hospital Services N.H.S. Trust v. 554 
Compass Group U.K. and Ireland Ltd.99 555 
Duties to negotiate (or renegotiate) bring with them special difficulties, as negotiation is 556 
an inherently uncertain process and may not lead to any concluded outcome. How is a court to 557 
judge if a party has failed to negotiate in good faith?100 Given this, courts have not been inclined 558 
                                                 
97 Id. at [175]. 
98  What good faith requires is sensitive to context  . . . “relational” contracts, as they 
are sometimes called, may require a high degree of communication, cooperation 
and predictable performance based on mutual trust and confidence and involve 
expectations of loyalty which are not legislated for in the express terms of the 
contract but are implicit in the parties understanding and necessary to give 
business efficacy to the arrangements  
 Yam Seng Pte. Ltd. v. Int’l Trade Corp. Ltd. [2013] EWHC (QB) 111 [141]–[142], 1 All ER (Comm) 
1321. 
99 [2013] EWCA (Civ.) 200; see id. at [109] (Jackson LJ); id. at [131] (Beatson LJ), who quotes the 
“sensitive to context” remark made by Leggatt J. in Yam Seng.  
100 A type of duty bearing some similarity to a duty to negotiate in good faith is a duty to use “best 
endeavors” or “reasonable endeavors” to agree a matter, often a price. For a case involving such a duty 
see, for instance, R. & D. Constr. Group Ltd. v. Hallam Land Mgmt. Ltd. [2009] CSOH 128 [49] (Scot), 
in which the court upheld a duty on a party to “use all reasonable endeavours” to agree a purchase price of 
land. Lord Hodge took the view that there was no “insuperable obstacle which would prevent the courts 
from reaching a view as to the means of achieving that object and deciding whether Hallam had used all 
reasonable endeavours to agree the price.” Id. 
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to enforce such duties unless typically they are (1) constituted by an express term imposing the 559 
duty within a long-term contractual relationship, and (2) there is a clear mechanism for judging 560 
the conformity of the parties’ negotiating efforts with a contractually stipulated process for 561 
negotiation. An example of a case where such a duty was enforced is the Scottish appeal level 562 
judgment in G4S Cash Centres (U.K.) Ltd. v. Clydesdale Bank PLC.101 The parties were in 563 
dispute as to the construction to be placed on provisions of a contract whereby G4S were to 564 
supply a cash processing service to the Bank, the provisions in dispute relating to the 565 
consideration to be paid to the Bank for those services.102 The contract contained a mechanism 566 
designed to allow the price payable to G4S to be renegotiated.103 The clause concerning the 567 
renegotiation process obliged the parties to “negotiate in good faith to agree such Services Fees” 568 
and continued that “any dispute shall be resolved in accordance with clause 12.”104 The appeal 569 
court held the duty to negotiate in good faith to be enforceable, commenting: 570 
The agreement does not, in our view, produce simply an agreement to agree or an 571 
agreement so uncertain as to be unenforceable . . . .The misconception in the [Bank’s] 572 
submission on this topic is that it fails to recognize that although consensus in idem is 573 
required before a contract can come into existence between the parties, it does not follow 574 
that there is simply an agreement to agree, in a contract designed to endure for some time, 575 
while there remains to be agreed something which affects the contractual relationship . . . 576 
.For parties in a commercial, long running, contract to leave matters on such a footing is 577 
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not “inherently improbable” but is commonplace in complex contractual arrangements 578 
intended to endure for substantial periods of time during changing circumstances.105 579 
The long-term, contextual nature of the parties’ relationships was clearly crucial in this case to 580 
the court’s finding, as was the fact that the expressly provided for renegotiation process was to 581 
be regulated by the provisions of a clause of the contract. Without such a process by which to 582 
judge the negotiations, it might have been more difficult to convince the court that the duty to 583 
renegotiate in good faith was not inherently ambiguous (and a mere “agreement to agree”106). 584 
There may, however, be something of a redundancy in the approach to good faith in such cases: 585 
If parties are to negotiate in good faith, but failures to agree are to be resolved by reference to a 586 
procedure (often arbitration by a third party), the good faith element requirement seems 587 
redundant. If parties can’t agree, they simply get a third party to determine the outcome, thereby 588 
effectively rendering the preceding negotiations in good faith redundant. But perhaps that 589 
doesn’t matter—showing good faith along the way is what counts to a relationship based on 590 
trust, even if acting in good faith doesn’t resolve the dispute.  591 
Without any express duty to renegotiate a specified matter in a contract, courts will not 592 
imply a duty to undertake such renegotiation in good faith. Contracts can work without price 593 
                                                 
105 Id. at [16]. 
106 In Barbudev v. Eurocom Cable Mgmt. Bulgaria EOOD & Ors [2012] EWCA (Civ) 548 [43], [44], 
[2012] 2 All ER (Comm) 963 (Eng.), where one party had offered the other “the opportunity to invest . . . 
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negotiate the Investment Agreement in good faith with you”, the court took the view this gave rise only to 
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renegotiation, even if at one extreme the price becomes arduous on one party107 or at the other it 594 
ceases to bring meaningful income to the other party. Requiring good faith renegotiation of a 595 
price, even in a long-term relational contract, would undermine the recently expressed view of 596 
the Supreme Court that there is no doctrine of equitable adjustment of contracts in Scots law.108 597 
At the pre-formation stage, the firm view of the House of Lords expressed in Walford v. Miles109 598 
was that courts will not imply a term into a preliminary contract requiring good faith negotiation 599 
of an intended longer-term contract, as such a term would be inherently repugnant to the 600 
adversarial position of the parties (a description which is clearly a long way from the cop-601 
operative dimension of the idea of good faith).110 602 
(e) An issue in need of exploration 603 
An interesting question is the extent to which an implied good faith based duty might be 604 
excluded by an express term in the parties’ contract. Where a good faith requirement derives 605 
from a statutory rule, it is usually the case that the rule cannot be excluded—as is the case, for 606 
instance, with the good faith performance duty under the U.C.C.111 or the unfair terms rule of the 607 
U.K.’s Consumer Rights Act 2015.112 In some contexts, the parties may be entitled to determine 608 
                                                 
107 See the recent case of Arnold v. Britton [2015] UKSC 36 [63]. 
108 Lloyds T.S.B. Foundation for Scotland v. Lloyds Banking Group PLC [2013] UKSC 3. 
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the level of good faith performance, subject to a control excluding the specification of an 609 
unreasonable standard.113 Non-statutory rules of the common law which can be said to manifest 610 
aspects of good faith can often be excluded by the parties: so for instance, default rules on 611 
justified withholding of performance can be so excluded. But are default rules expressly based 612 
on good faith to be treated differently? And does it make a difference if the duty derives from 613 
such a default rule as opposed to a so-called implied term? 614 
Where a good faith requirement is the subject only of a possible common law implied 615 
term, in theory it should be possible to exclude it: Express terms trump implied terms. The 616 
validity of such a term could be defended as an expression of freedom of contract, even if it 617 
might be highly unusual and unlikely for one party expressly to declare that it was entitled to 618 
perform its obligations or enforce its remedies in a manner inconsistent with good faith (such a 619 
course of action would hardly be a good selling point for the party advancing the exclusionary 620 
term).  621 
There might  be cases where the relationship between the parties is one of such 622 
dependency by one party on the other that the resulting trust reposed in the stronger party 623 
necessarily creates a relationship of inherent good faith. An attempted express exclusion of good 624 
faith in such a relationship could be said to be nonsensical, and a court faced with such a clause 625 
might perhaps attempt to interpret it against the natural meaning of its wording. Even where it is 626 
not good faith specifically which is excluded, but (as more commonly happens) the liability of 627 
one party to the other for some loss, a court may feel that such exclusion is not consistent with 628 
the good faith nature of the parties’ relationship. A good example of this is the case of H.I.H. 629 
                                                 
113 See  id. (entitling the parties to determine the standard of good faith performance so long as such 
standard is not “manifestly unreasonable”).  
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Casualty v. Chase Manhattan Bank,114 in which the House of Lords held that an ex facie blanket 630 
exclusion of liability by one party was not to be interpreted as excluding liability for its deceit.115 631 
Lord Bingham, explaining their Lordships’ view, remarked that “[p]arties entering into a 632 
commercial contract . . . will assume the honesty and good faith of the other; absent such an 633 
assumption they would not deal.”116 634 
Apart from cases of inherent good faith deriving from the nature of the relationship, such 635 
as H.I.H. Casualty, might express exclusions of implied good faith terms be successful? It seems 636 
that attempts deriving from an express term excluding all implied terms (an “entire agreement” 637 
clause) are less likely to be viewed favorably by courts. Three cases involving such clauses may 638 
be noted. In the English case of Mid Essex Hospital v. Compass Group UK, Jackson L.J. 639 
expressed the view that the implied duty to exercise a contractual discretion in a fashion which is 640 
not arbitrary, capricious or irrational would be “extremely difficult to exclude, although I would 641 
not say it is utterly impossible to do so”117 (the “although . . . .” is an important rider). In a more 642 
prescriptive manner, the Supreme Court of Canada remarked “[b]ecause the duty of honesty in 643 
contractual performance is a general doctrine of contract law that applies to all contracts, like 644 
unconscionability, the parties are not free to exclude it . . . .”118 It is interesting that the invalidity 645 
in this case was linked to a duty said to rest upon a “general doctrine” and not an implied term.119 646 
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In its decision, the Canadian court referred approvingly to the third case, an earlier judgment of 647 
the Australian Federal Court, GEC Marconi Systems Pty. Ltd. v. BHP Information Technology 648 
Pty. Ltd., in which Finn J. had remarked “I find arresting the suggestion that an entire agreement 649 
clause is of itself sufficient to constitute an ‘express exclusion’ of an implied duty of good faith 650 
and fair dealing where that implication would otherwise have been made by law.”120 The 651 
preponderance of opinion is that entire agreement clauses will not exclude implied duties of good 652 
faith, this suggesting that a targeted exclusion might be successful. But there is some uncertainty, 653 
as seen in Jackson L.J.’s rider.  654 
Further judicial examination of the preferable approach to the purported exclusion of 655 
implied good faith duties would be welcome. In particular, it would be helpful to see attention 656 
paid to two issues: (1) whether targeted exclusions of good faith implied terms are any more 657 
likely to be successful than generalized “entire agreement” exclusions; and (2) whether it makes 658 
a difference that good faith is described by a legal system as an implied term as opposed to an 659 
underlying doctrine or rule of contract law, the suspicion being that in the latter instance 660 
exclusion will be harder, if not impossible.    661 
E. CONCLUSION 662 
By way of conclusion, the following is a summary of the principal points made in the course of 663 
this paper: 664 
1. Typically, British courts have conceived of good faith in broad brush terms. Specifically, 665 
the courts have identified honesty, openness, loyalty/fidelity, and mutual trust and 666 
confidence as the elements of the principle of good faith. Good faith ideas can be 667 
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manifested in contract terms which do not explicitly use the term good faith but 668 
nonetheless act as substantive equivalents.121 669 
2. Theoretically, good faith might be used either as a reason for implying a term, procedural 670 
good faith, or else to fashion the content of an implied-in-fact term, so that a party is 671 
required to conduct itself in good faith, substantial good faith.122 672 
3. In practice, there is no support for using good faith as a gateway for implying a term in 673 
United Kingdom jurisprudence. The traditional tests for implication, “business efficacy” 674 
and “officious bystander”, place a higher hurdle (necessity) in the way of implication 675 
than does good faith, with its connotations of reasonableness and equity.123  676 
4. Furthermore, because good faith does not characterize all contractual relationships, good 677 
faith is, in general, neither a necessary nor sufficient reason for implying a term into a 678 
contract.124 679 
5. In terms of substantive good faith, good faith does not require an absolute subservience 680 
of the interests of one party to those of another.125 681 
6. Terms embodying substantive good faith are more likely to be implied into relational 682 
contracts, but the mere fact that a contract endures over time is not of itself sufficient to 683 
justify such implication. Any suggested term must still be necessary to make the contract 684 
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work, must be consistent with the expressly agreed terms, and must reflect the underlying 685 
though unexpressed intentions of the parties.126  686 
7. The remedy of contract termination has been thought (see the Monde Petroleum case) not 687 
to be susceptible to good faith regulation, given its binary nature. It has been suggested, 688 
however, that a binary choice does not necessarily preclude the operation of discretion. 689 
The number of choices is not the issue; rather, at issue is whether (1) any objectively 690 
ascertainable conditions requiring to be met before the decision may be exercised have 691 
been met; and (2) thereafter, what further conditions (if any) constrain the decision-692 
making process. Such further conditions could involve discretion, but no such restraining 693 
conditions exist in relation to the default common law right to terminate (save that the 694 
breach must be material, which could be seen as an inbuilt good faith restraint).127 695 
8. It is crucial to plead the specific context of parties’ relationships in order to justify 696 
implication of a good faith based term.128  697 
9. Without an express duty to renegotiate a specified matter in a contract, British courts will 698 
not imply a duty to undertake such renegotiation in good faith.129 699 
10. Exclusion of good faith implied common law terms should in theory be possible, at least 700 
in some cases. However, the specific context may render such an exclusion nonsensical. 701 
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Moreover, courts have not been well disposed to attempts to exclude implied good faith 702 
via “entire contracts” clauses. 130 703 
11. Some of the requirements of substantive good faith could be written into the law as rules 704 
rather than as implied terms. In conceivably developing such an approach, however, 705 
careful consideration would be required. While the application of common law rules can 706 
sometimes be excluded by the parties, the entrenching of a good faith based rule would 707 
represent a deeper embedding of a good faith commitment within the legal system.131  708 
12. Judicial commentary on the question of whether good faith should be seen as underlying 709 
all instances of contract, or rather (as this article argues) the presence or absence of a 710 
good faith relationship is a matter of fact to be judged in each case, would be welcome.132 711 
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